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THEMAJOR OBJECTIVE of Federal Reserve policy while the war con-
tinues is to assist the government in financing the war effort. The
character and size of the Reserve System's task in war finance is
primarily determined by the scale of the government's spending
program and by the extent to which this expenditure is covered by
taxes and by sales of United States securities to nonbank investors.
The magnitude of the undertaking confronting the System is
indicated by the figures presented in Table 1, which are based on
the current records and budget estimates of federal expenditures
and public debt increases, coupled with data and estimates showing
the participation of the banking system in financing the federal debt.
Commercial bank participation in the government's financing
program during the coming months of war is necessarily highly
conjectural. However, itis widely assumed that the banks will
continue to make substantial additions to their government security
portfolios. It is estimated that even with considerable success in sell-
ing government security offerings outside the banking system, total
bank holdings of federal debt will range from $95 billion to $107
billion by the end of June 1945.
FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
IN WARTIME
For the duration of the war the Federal Reserve officials will pre-
sumably endeavor within the limits of their powers to keep govern-
merit borrowing from commercial banks at the lowest level, com-
patible witli and adequate provision of the funds required
for war purposes. Although the character of the government's tax-
ing and borrowing program is not a responsibility o. the Federal
Reserve officials, they conduct research on problems connected with
the program and offer suggestions to the Congress and to the
Treasury that may affect the decisions finally made. When thegovernment's war financing program has assumed definite form
the Federal Reserve officials are obliged to cooperate in carrying
it out. This undertaking involves full banking support for Treasury
borrowing operations; it entails facilitation of the flow of bank
credit into war production channels and restriction of its employ-
ment in nonwar uses; and it necessitates greatly expanded fiscal
services for the Treasury and other government agencies.
TABLE I —FEDERALEXPENDITURES, INCREASE IN THE FEDERAL DEBT,
AND CHANGES IN BANKING SYSTEM'S HOLDINGS OF FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS,
FISCAL YEARS, 1941-45
(dollar figures in billions)
FISCAL YEARS ENDING JUNE 30
Reported Estimated
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Federal expendituresa $13 $32 $80 $95 $lOOb
Increase in federal debt 6 22 64 62 50b
Total interest-bearing debt out-
standing, direct and fully
guaranteed 55 77 141 203 253
Increase in banking system's
holdings of federalobligationsc 3 7 31 23 12-24d
Total holdings of federal
obligations by banking system 22 29 60 83 95-107d
Increase in banking system's
holdings of federal debt as
percentage of the net increase
in federal debt 54% 29% 48% 37% 24-48%d
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletins and Statement of the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget, August 1944.
a Government expenditures plus net expenditures by government corporations and
agencies.
b Estimates based on the Statement of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget,
August 1944.
c All commercial banks and the Federal Reserve Banks.
d Range estimates by the author, conservative and liberal.
PROVISION OF RESERVES AND CURRENCY
Most important of the functions of the Federal Reserve Banks
while war is in progress is to provide commercial. banks with ade-.
quate reserves.These reserves serve to finance their purchases
of government securities, to support possible loan expansion, and
2to compensate for the wartime expansion of currency in circulation.
The greater proportion of the funds acquired by the government
from sales of its obligations to commercial banks remains in the
banking system in the form of deposits, although these deposits are
shifted from bank to bank as disbursements are made. In other
words, commercial bank purchases of government securities gen-
erate means of payment in the form of demand deposits subject to
check. The Federal Reserve Banks hold the legal reserves of mem-
ber banks, and the member banks in turn hold a substantial part
of the reserves of nonmember banks as well as most of the com-
mercial bank deposits of the country, which constitute the chief
means of payment. In this way the Federal Reserve Banks are
actively assisting in the wartime expansion of commercial bank
deposits.
An extraordinarily large wartime demand for currency also has
to be met. To satisfy that demand, member banks obtain currency
by drawing against their deposit balances with the Federal Reserve
Banks, by selling acceptable assets to the Federal Reserve Banks
(e.g., Treasury bills), or by borrowing from them.
The Federal Reserve Banks can expand credit within the limits
set by the reserve requirements of 40 percent gold against notes and
35 percent lawful money against deposits. These limitations are
not rigid, as reserve requirements may be suspended under the
emergency powers of the Board of Governors. Moreover, increased
demands for currency could be met in part by issuing Federal
Reserve Bank notes requiring no gold cover.Relief might also
come through Treasury action to increase its own currency issues,
by monetization of the gold held by the exchange stabilization
fund, by issuance of additional silver certificates against free silver
bullion, or by the issue of United States notes as provided under
existing statutory powers.Finally, legislation might be passed
lowering or eliminating gold reserve requirements against Federal
Reserve notes in circulation. Although the reserve ratios of the
Federal Reserve Banks were still considerably above the statutory
minima at the end of June 1944, the ratio has been moving down-
ward since our entry into the war and remedial action of some sort
may become necessary. In World War I following this country's
entry into the war, the reserve ratiosthe Reserve Banks similarly
declined, and the Federal Reserve Banks were required to husband
3their gold in order to sustain the expansion of bank credit.'
Until the end of 1940 the inflow of gold was more than sufficient
to offset the outflow of currency into circulation and to furnish the
larger reserves required to support a growing volume of deposits.
But by the early part of 1941 gold shipments had virtually ceased,
as indicated by Chart 1, further acquisitions being confined largely
to ne.w production, while gold buying for the account of foreign
central banks and governments began to make inroads on gold
stocks.Between October 1941—when they reached a peak—and
June 30, 1944, gold stocks declined $1.6 billion. (See Chart 1.) The
actual loss of gold to foreign countries has been somewhat in excess
of the decline in gold stocks since stocks were augmented during this
period through domestic production. The leveling off and subse-
quent decline of gold holdings were accompanied by a continued
rise in deposits and currency in circulation. The result was a rapid
decline in excess reserves shown in Chart 2, which was felt most
sharply in New York where banks were losing funds to the rest
of the country. Finally, in April 1942 the Federal Reserve Banks
1changesin the ratio of total reserves of Federal Reserve Banks to deposit and Fed-
eral Reserve note liabilities combined during World Wars I and II compare as follows:
World War I World War Ii
December 31, 191594.1%a August 31, 193986.9%
December 31, 191681.4a December 31, 193986.7
April (5-6)191784.7 December 31, 194090.8
December 28, 191763.6 December 31, 194190.8
December 27, 191850.6 December 31, 194276.3
June 27, 191952.1 December 31, 194362.6
June 30, 194456.3
a The reserve percentages prior to 1917 are not strictly comparable with
those of later years. Net deposits of the Federal Reserve Banks were used
as the basis of the calculations in 1915 and 1916; thereafter, total deposits
were used.
The Federal Reserve Act of 1914 by lowering reserve requirements of member l)anks
gave the newly established System a strong leverage, position, since the provision of a
small addition to the reserves of member banks could support a larger volume of
deposit.s than formerly. Many state legislatures followed suit in lowering reserve re-
quirementS and this strengthened the reserve position of the Federal Reserve Banks.
Another change in reserve requirements of member banks was made in 1917, and was
coupled with a provision requiring that total legal reserves be deposited with the Fed-
eral Reserve Banks. The conditions of membership for state banks were also made
more attractive and a number of large state banks joined the System during the period.
These developments increased thegold stockat the disposal of the Federal Reserve
Banks, and to make this gold go further the Federal Reserve Banks frequently bor-
rowed from oiie another.
4CHART I —GOLDSTOCK, MONEY IN CIRCULATIONAND RESERVEBANK
CREDIT, WORLD WARS I ANI) TI
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0began to provide funds to the commercial banks through their
credit operations and subsequently supplied them at a rapid rate.
The growth of currency in circulation from the end of 1941 to
1944 absorbed $11.3
tional credit provided by the Federal Reserve Banks in this period.
CHART 2— MEMBER BANK











Source: WorldWar1,Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking
Studies (1941)andBanking and Monetary Statistics (1944).WorldWar II, Federal
Reserve Bulletins.
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June 30, billion of the $12.9 billion of addi-
0
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944Reserve balances of member banks have remained relatively steady
since the middle of 1940: they amounted to $12.5 billion on Decem-
ber 31, 1941, $13.1 billion on December 31, 1942, and stood at $12.9
on December 31, 1943, and on June 30, 1944. In contrast to this
situation, excess reserves declined steadily over the same four-year
period.
Events in World War I took a somewhat comparable course. A
large gold inflow occurred before our entry into the war and built
up excess banking reserves, as depicted by the insert panel on
Chart 2. Revision of reserve requirements and wartime expansion
of deposits and currency in circulation imposed a strain on com-
mercial bank reserves. Consequently, a large amount of Federal
Reserve credit had to be extended to reduce this pressure. The
sharp decline in member bank excess reserves in 1917, shown in
the insert panel, resulted from an amendment of the Federal
Reserve Act which re-defined legal reserves to include only balances
held with the Federal Reserve Banks, but lowered the total reserve
requirement.
STABILIZATION OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET
Another function of the Federal Reserve System that has been
extremely important since the outbreak of World War II is the
stabilization of the market for government securities.For some
years before the war the Federal Reserve officials accepted respon-
sibility for maintaining "orderly conditions" in the government
bond market. In 1938, this policy was supplemented by an agree-
ment of the Federal Reserve and other bank supervisory agencies
to value, for examination purposes, investment bonds at book or
cost less amortization, whichever is lower. Under such an arrange-
ment, a decline in the market value of government or securi-
ties would not produce a shrinkage in the appraised value of bank
investments and thus would not precipitate "distress sales" by banks.
In 1939 after war broke out in Europe, the Federal Reserve Banks
made large-scale purchases of government bonds in the open market
in fulfillment of the commitment to maintain "orderly conditions."
Between August 28 and September 25 when purchases ceased, the
Federal Reserve Banks acquired $473 million of government secur-
ities.2 Thereafter recovery in market values was rapid and some
2Boardof Governors of the Federal Seserve System, Annual Report, 1939, p. 7.
7of these acquisitions were disposed of before the end of the year.
in undertaking these open market operations the Board of Gov-
ernors indicated that it and the Reserve Banks recognized "a meas-
ure of responsibility for safeguarclin.g the large United States Gov-
ernment portfolio of the member banks from unnecessarily wide
and violent fluctuations in price." It added emphatically, however,
that "The System cannot and does not guarantee any current prices
of government obligations nor does it undertake to preserve for
member banks such profits as they may have on their Government
securities, or to protect them against losses in this account."3 How-
ever, in December 1941 immediately following our entry into the
war the Board took a more positive attitude toward stabilization,
announcing that it would "exert its influence toward maintaining
conditions in the United States Government security market that
are satisfactory from the standpoint of the Government's require-
ments." This somewhat ambiguous declaration was another step
in the direction of stabilization of the government bond market on
the basis of the existing pattern of interest rates. In the course of
1942 more definite commitments with respect to the bond market
were made.
At the end of April 1942 a discount rate ofof 1 percent per
annum was established by the Open Market Committee for all
Treasury bills that might be offered to the Federal Reserve Banks.
This measure was supplemented in August by instructions to the
banks to give to sellers of bills, if desired, an option to repurchase
at the same rate a like amount of bills of the same maturity.
With regard to other rates, it was stated that "the policy of the
Treasury and of the Federal Reserve System has been directed
towards the stabilization of prices and yields of marketable securi-
ties.Investors in nonmarketable securities know in advance the
prices at which they will be able to redeem their securities on any
future date that they may find it necessary to do so.Investors in
marketable securities know that prices and yields are stabilized and
that they will obtain no higher yields by deferring purchases to a
future date."4Under this stabilized structure of interest rates
Slbid., p.5.
4FederalReserve Bulletin (February 1943)p. 114. Commenting upon the applica.
tion of this policy during 1943, the Board of Governors declared in its Annual Report
(p. 12) for that year: "It maintained stable conditions in the United States Govern-
ment security market and kept prices and yields within a pattern agreed upon with
83-month Treasury bills have carried a rate ofpercent; 1-year
certificates of indebtedness,percent; 10-year issues, 2 percent;
and the longest-term offerings 2½ percent.
In the latter part of 1942 the Treasury let it be known that all
new issues available for purchase by commercial banks would come
within a 10-year maturity limit; it was also indicated that the maxi-
mum rate of interest on securities sold to commercial banks would
be 2 percent. In October 1942, Daniel W. Bell, Under Secretary of
the Treasury, stated: "It seems reasonable that the interest rate
on securities financed in this manner (i.e., securities bought by com-
mercial banks) should be kept down to a maximum of 2 percent,
regardless of the maturities involved, because the costs incurred by
the banks in making loans direct to the government and in handling
the increased deposits resulting from these loans are small."5
This policy was somewhat modified in the Fourth War Loan
when commercial banks were permitted to subscribe to the 21/4 and
21/2 percent bonds and to Series F and G savings bonds in amounts
not over 10 percent of their savings deposits but not exceeding
$200,000 in the aggregate. Banks coul.d not, however, hold more
than $100,000 of the savings bonds. Permission to purchase longer-
term bonds and to acquire Series F and G savings bonds was given
to the commercial banks in the Fifth Loan Drive also. Limitations
on the aggTegate amount of savings bonds that a bank might hold
remained unchanged but total purchases of bonds and savings
bonds, including those purchased during the Fourth Drive,
raised to 20 percent of savings deposits but not to exceed $400,000
in the aggregate.
INFLUENCING THE VOLUME OF BANK CREDIT IN SELECTED USES
BY SPECIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
The Federal Reserve officials not only facilitate the expansiOn of
bank credit in wartime but they endeavor to see that 'such credit
is used to further the war effort.In accordance with this policy
they have fostered bank financing of production fri war industries
and used their influence to reduce certain types of nonessential
the Treasury. This policy facilitated thesale of securitiesby removing all incentive
fordelayinginvcsnicntandby encouragingpurchasei'sto hold the securities
had acquired."
5Addressto the liivestment Bankers Association of America.
9procedure, cancellation is followed by freezing of loans made to
finance such contracts until ten days after payments have been
received under contracts. The borrower, moreover, need not make
any payments of interest or principal on the suspended portion of
the loan. Meanwhile, the guarantor will pay interest up to 21/2
percenton the suspended loan if the loan continues to be held by
a bank. Thus both borrower and lender are protected during the
period following cancellation of contracts until payment is made.
At first the suspension provisions of Regulation V applied only
to loans outstanding, thus giving the borrower an incentive to use
funds continuously and to the full amount consistent with produc-
tion under war contracts. Then in case of a cessation of hostilities
less working capital would be tied up and cash on hand could be
used for any purpose desired. The added interest cost on the portion
of the loan in use that was not needed was paid to insure availability
of these funds in case of sudden termination of contracts.
Many firms unable to obtain V loans because of their strong
credit position were faced with the problem of obtaining unguar-
anteed bank loans to finance war contracts, and in the event of
cancellation, to meet interest charges on such loans regardless of
delays in settlement of contract. As a result an increasing number
of contractors became reluctant to accept more war orders. Hence
modifications were made in Regulation V loans in September 1943
to enable war contractors and subcontractors to arrange lines of
credit in advance of need as an assurance that working capital
would not be frozen in event of contract termination.'0 The modi-
fled broader plan—the VT loans—enabled "contractors to obtain
the use of most of their own working capital immediately upon
termination of their contracts."Contractors and subcontractors
follow the same procedure in obtaining VT loans as V loans, with
two exceptions. If the loan is intended to free the borrower's own
working capital, the lending bank must at all times have a par-
ticipation in the loan.Accordingly, the original percentage of
guarantee specified in the agreement is not increased by contract
cancellations. The lending bank must also share with the govern-
ment any commitment fee which may not exceed ½of1 percent
10"BroadenedBasis for Regulation V Loans,"FederalReserve Bulletin (September
1943) pp. also Roy A. Foulke, "Government Financing of War Contractors,"
Dun's Review, Part II (July 1944) p. 28,
12per annum on the undisbursed portion of the credit.
As in the caseV loans, VT loans carry guarantees of the War
or Navy Departments, while the Federal Reserve Banks act as fiscal
agents. However, VT loans do not fully protect commercial banks
against loss. Hence some contractors in a weak position have been
forced to rely whoiiy upon V loans under modified borrowing
formulas applying both to canceled and uncanceled contracts.
Loans guaranteed under Regulation V accounted for almost half
the total estimated increase in loans made for war production pur-
poses during 1942.In 1943 the volume of guaranteed loans out-
standing increased rapidly, rising from $804 million at the begin-
ning of the year to $1.9 billion by the end of December1' and to $2.1
billion by June 30, 1944. Even more significant is the rise, from
$2.7 billion at the beginning of 1943 to $8 billion on June 30, 1944,
in the volume of funds authorized to be made available to borrowers
under guarantee agTeements. Approximately half the number of
loans made under Regulation V through 1943 were for $100,000
or less, while loans of $25 million or over constituted about one
half of the dollar amount.'2
Since V and VT loans have to be arranged prior to cancellation
of contracts, the need for guaranteed loans to be negotiated subse-
quent to termination of contracts was recognized in the Baruch-
Hancock report on War and Posiwar Adjustment Policies. In line
with the recommendations of that report the Contract Termination
Act of June 1944 provided for T loans available to any war con-
tractor who "is or has been engaged in performing any operation
deemed...tobe connected with or related to war production."
The act sets up an Office of Contract Settlement headed by a Direc-
tor who is empowered to determine the procedure to be followed
by the War Department, Navy Department and Maritime Com-
mission in guaranteeing termination loans. The Federal Reserve
Banks serve solely as fiscal agents, as they do for V and VT loans.
Under General Regulation No. 1 issued August 18, 1944, by the
Director of Contract Settlement, contracting agencies are instructed
to delegate authority to the Reserve Banks to approve applications
for guarantees of loans after consultation with representatives of
such agencies.If there are no representatives available, necessary
11 Includes VT loans in the late months of the year.
12 Board ol Governors o€ the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1943, pp. 20-21.
13authority is to be delegated to the Reserve Banks to insure prompt
processing of applications.
There was considerable criticism of the lack of standardization
of V and VT loans and the delays encountered in qualifying for
them. Procedures for obtaining T loans were accordingl.y simplified
with a view to making such loans more readily available to con-
tractors.
Regulation W—Consumer Credit
Besides encouraging the extension of credit for war production, the
Federal Reserve officials took steps even before the United States
entered the war to reduce the volume of consumer credit. In Sep-
tember 1941 while the country was still in the defense stages of
war preparation, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, acting
under the authority of an executive order, put into effect Regu-
lation W. This regulation was one means of helping to limit the
demand for commodities to those market supplies which were avail-
able, and of slowing the pace of the wartime inflationary move-
ment.'8 Originally applicable only to instalment sales and loans
repayable in instalments, the regulation was subsequently extended
to include charge accounts and single payment loans. The restric-
tions cover consumer credits, whether extended by commercial
banks or by other organizations.
Controls were applied to consumer credit by shortening the
period of repayment and by raising the percentage of down pay-
ments required on commodity instalment purchase loans.14 Interest
charges, however, were not used as a means of control. This was
because they constitute a relatively unimportant part of the total
operating costs of specialized consumer financing agencies, are an
even smaller part of the total monthly payment by consumer instal-
ment borrowers, and are absorbed in charge account credit as a
cost of selling goods.
Regulation W is of course only one of the factors responsible for
the reduction of consumer debt during the war. The rise in individ-
ual incomes has facilitated repayment of outstanding debt, and has
enabled more people to pay cash for purchases. Together with the
18Boardof Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1941, p. 58.
14SeeGottfried Haberler, Consumer Instalment Credit and Economic Fluctuations
(National BureauEconomic Research, Financial Research Program, 1942) pp. 161-62.
14scarcity of goods customarily bought on the instalment plan, this
rise has also greatly contracted the need and demand for consumer
credit.
At the close of 1941 total consumer credit outstanding amounted
to $9.5 billion and by June 30, 1944 ii had fallen to approximately
$5.0 billion; most of this red'uction was accounted for by the decline
of instalment credit.
Supervision and Examination
The supervisory and examining functions of the Federal Reserve
officials provide a means of influencing to a moderate extent the
amount of credit in selected areas, and the war necessity has pointed
the way to a more effective employment of bank examination as a
supplementary control instrumentality. In addition bank super-
vision and examination have been relied upon to influence bank
investment in, and lending on, government securities.
On May 7, 1942, all of the federal bank supervisory agencies
joined in urging lenders to accelerate the repayment of outstanding
loans made for nonproductive purposes. In addition, examiners
were asked "to pay particular attention in the course of their exam-
inations to individual debt to determine whether it is being reduced
and to the circumstances which may be preventing its reduction or
preventing it being put on an amortization basis."5 Again on
June 17, 1942, all banks and other financial institutions were urged
to cooperate through credit policy in discouraging the unnecessary
accumulation of inventories of consumer goods. Examiners of the
Federal Reserve Banks, of the Comptroller of the Currency and of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation were instructed to
ascertain the extent to which banks were complying with this sug-
gestion and to discuss the urgency of reducing nonproductive credit
with the appropriate bank officers.'6
Adjustments and revisions of the supervisory standards of the
Federal Reserve System and other examining authorities have been
necessary to facilitate commercial bank participation in the wartime
government security market. The increase in deposit liabilities
resulting from this participation has not been accompanied by pro-
portionate increases in bank capital accounts, a fact that caused the
15 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1942, p. 112.
16 Thid., pp. 113-14.
15Federal Reserve officials and other bank supervisory agencies to
modify their traditional rule-of-thumb standard of a 10 to 1 ratio
of deposits to bank capital. They announced (November 1942)
that there would be no deterrents in examination or supervisory
policy to investments by banks in government securities of all types
eligible for bank purchases, and that banks would not be criticized
for utilizing their idle funds as far as possible in making such
investments. The banks were also advised that loans to customers
for the purpose of buying government securities would not be
criticized by examiners provided the loans were fully repayable
within six months.'7
The significance of th.e capital to deposit ratio has clearly been
altered by the increase in deposits resulting from bank investment
in government securities, which are generally regarded as riskiess
assets. Moreover, increases in bank reserves have added to the pro-
tection afforded depositors in recent years.'8If cash, reserves,
amounts due from banks, and government securities are eliminated,
the ratio of capital to the remaining assets of member banks is
higher now than it was when we entered the war.'9
As the borrowing program has expanded some modifications of
these supervisory policies have been required. Examining authori-
ties have found it expedient to qualify their November 1942 an-
nouncement by cautioning individual banks whose deposits have
grown most rapidly against an unbalanced investment policy in gov-
ernment securities.
In order to assure the distribution of new issues, the Treasury
offers its securities at prices slightly below those that the market
17Ibid.,p. 21.
18FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report, 1942; and Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report, 1943, p. 30. "Increases in banks'
capital accounts in recent years have been much smaller, relatively, than increases in
bankliabilities.There is, in other words, less margin for the protection of the gen-
eral depositors, if the nature of bank assets is disregarded. But most of the increase
in liabilities has been accompanied by growth in assets involving no risk of loss and
the ratio of capital accounts to what are sometimes termed 'risk assets' (all assets other
than cash, reserves, due from banks and Government securities)is higher now than it
was at the beginning of the war. On December 31, 1943, this ratio for all member
banks as a group was 29 percent compared with 23 percent on December 31, 1941."
19Thesubject is treated more extensively in C. R. Whittlesey's, Bank Liquidity and
the War (National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, ins.
1944).
16(particularly the banks) is willing to pay. As a result the use of
bank credit for speculation in government securities tends to be
encouraged.It has been further encouraged by the stabilization
of the structure of prices and interest rates on government obliga-
tions and by prohibiting banks from subscribing to new Treasury
offerings, except in limited amounts. Consequently, banks have
been urged to restrict their loans on government issues to bona fide
investors. The increase in loans on securities by weekly reporting
member banks throughout the country was about $700 million dur-
ing the First War Loan Drive, approximately $1.3 billion in the
Second Drive, more than $1.8 billion in the Third, $1.1 billion in
the Fourth, while the Fifth Loan Drive topped all the preceding
figures. Between May 31 and July 12, 1944 weekly reporting mem-
ber banks' loans on government securities increased about $1.9
billion, $600 million of which consisted of loans to security brokers
and dealers.
The large volume of bank credit used to finance security pur-
chases attracted unfavorable notice during the Third Loan Drive,
when it first became evident that a large proportion of the loans
was speculative in character.20 Hence, in their preparation for the
Fourth Loan Drive, the Federal Reserve officials urged commercial
banks to confine loans on government securities to legitimate credit
needs of dealers and investors. The consequent voluntary rationing
of bank credits, and the fact that anticipated gains from speculative
purchases during the Third Loan Drive failed to materialize, ac-
counted for a sharp reduction in bank borrowing during the Fourth
War Loan Drive.
Again during the Fifth Drive some of the loans were suspected
of being speculative and were subjected to criticism. The Federal
Reserve Bulletin stated: "It seems likely that ...aconsiderable
amount of loans made during the recent drive were obtained with
20TheFederal Reserve Bank of New York, Annual Report, 1943, p. 29, states: "bank
financing of speculative subscriptions to Government securities was opposed, and the
President of this bank, on September 1, addressed a letter to all banks in the District
urging them ...todiscourage speculative subscripiions to War Loans securities?'
Federal Reserve Bulletin (November 1943) p. 1057; and the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, Monthly Review (December 1, 1948): "Some part of the Government
securities purchased by the banks appears to have been supplied as a result of the
practice of free-riding. In other words, speculators have obtained allotments of Gov-
ernment securities and later resold thea to obtain profit from the premiums com-
manded by the new issues after the closing of the books for the receipt of subscriptions."
17the view to subsequent sale of the securities. Such loans are in con-
travention of the request made by the Treasury before the drive.
It seems also that in some cases subscriptions have been made by
nonbank purchasers with an understanding that the banks would
subsequently take over the securities. This is contrary to the ob-
jective of the drive which is to sell securities to nonbank purthasers
who intend to hold them as investments."21
FISCAL AND OTHER FUNCTIONS
Although the Federal Reserve officials are primarily concerned
during the war period with problems of raising funds for the gov-
ernment, they also serve as fiscal agents for the Treasury and for
such government agencies as the Reconstruction Finance Corpora.
lion, its subsidiaries, and the Commodity Credit Corporation. Until
1943, Federal Reserve officials assisted the Treasury in organizing
sales of federal obligations to nonbank investors. In addition, the
Federal Reserve Banks disbursed funds to pay for commodities
bought by these agencies for the procurement and stock-piling of
strategic and critical materials, and for the expansion of production
facilities for the manufacture of war materiel. When requested they
hold warehouse receipts and maintain inventory records for govern-
merit purchasing agents. They also handle the very considerable
disbursements of allied belligerent governments for war supplies.
The requirements of the war have increased tremendously the
volume of work the Federal Reserve Banks have been called upon
to undertake as fiscal agents for the Treasury, and operations con-
nected with the distribution, exchange and redemption of public
debt obligations have grown by leaps and bounds. Many millions
of checks drawn by disbursing officers are handled by the Federal
Reserve Banks. Other millions of checks received in payment of
taxes and customs are deposited with the Federal Reserve Banks
and credited to the general account of the Treasury. At the close
of 1943, about 12,400 officers and employees, or approximately 50
percent of the entire personnel of the Banks, were doing various
kinds of work for other government departments and agencies. By
comparison not quite 4,000 employees, or roughly 30 percent of
the total personnel were similarly engaged at the end of 1941.22
21 Federal Reserve Bulletin (August 1944) p. 746.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Retorts, 1941 and 1943.
18The Federal Reserve Banks cooperate, too, withthe agencies
conducting economic warfare, by administering the Foreign Funds
Control under general authorization from the Treasury. This
involves control of all,transactions affecting the "nationals" of
blocked countries, as well as the control of all imports of dollar
currency into the United States. Another activity, initiated early
in 1942 at the request of the Treasury, is the administration by the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco of the property of evacuated
Japanese in the Twelfth District.Finally, the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors and the Reserve Banks collaborate with other
government agencies in research activities to the war effort
and to the solution of postwar problems.
These varied fiscal, depository, custodial and collaborative re-
search functions become especially important in wartime because
of the rapid expansion of the government's spending, borrowing,
lending and taxing activities. They do not involve decisions as to
credit policy, but they do emphasize the subordination in wartime
of the Federal Reserve Banks' role as bankers' banks to their role
as bankers to the government. Moreover, these numerous and
varied functions effect closer working contacts between the Reserve
Banks and other public agencies, and should help to bring about a
more consistent and better coordinated plan of fiscal and credit
operations.
WARTIME PROBLEMS OF PROVIDING MEMBER
BANK RESERVES
The key policy problem of the Federal Reserve authorities in aiding
the war financing program is the selection of the method to be fol-
l.owed in supplying member banks with reserves needed to finance
their purchases of government securities and to meet the wartime
growth of currency in circulation. There are a number of methods
that may be used to meet this problem, and in making their choice
the officials must not only deal with the immediate situation but
must make provision for future developments. Consequently, the
method adopted must establish a position that gives the utmost
latitude for changes in policy when circumstances warrant such
changes. In addition to monetary expansion, particular attention
19